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This article examines policy implementation in the Pakistan education 
sector introduced by the Musharraf local government reforms between 
2001 and 2009.  By devolving administrative and financial powers from 
the provincial to local government, the reforms sought to address 
weaknesses in existing local government provision.  Our analysis 
developed a process model of policy implementation that suggests that 
while extensive structural decentralisation did occur, in practice this was 
more limited leading to what we term enacted management discretion, 
where local managers overcame weak organisational capacity, resource 
constraints and increased bureaucratic control from higher tiers of 
provincial government to manage and deliver educational services. 
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Enacted discretion: policy implementation, local government reform and 
education services in Pakistan 
 
Introduction 
Decentralisation has become an important driver of local government reform in recent 
years with several policy initiatives that have seen changed structures, funding and 
accountability mechanisms (Kwon 2013).  A key part of Pakistan’s 2001 local 
government reforms focussed on decentralisation and was based on an 
acknowledgement that in order to provide efficient services, a bottom up approach to 
restructuring was needed (National Reconstruction Bureau 2000).  The reforms were 
also unusual in that they were introduced by the Musharraf military government to 
promote non-political local democracy. Unlike attempts at decentralization in other 
countries that have been motivated by changes in state ideology or other forms of 
multilateral pressure, in Pakistan, the military’s need for legitimization of state control 
was the prime reason behind local government reform (Cheema, Khwaja, and Qadir 
2006). The reform policy also aimed to address weaknesses in existing local 
government by introducing extensive decentralization and electoral reforms intended to 
create local ownership of institutions by the devolution of political, administrative and 
financial decision making to local government (Government of Pakistan 2000; Manning 
et al. 2003; Kardar 2006).  In this paper, we examine the role of managerial discretion in 
the implementation of local government reform.   
Studies of policy implementation have a rich history.  Early work emphasised a 
top down approach with policy designed centrally and implemented automatically at 
lower levels emphasising implementation factors that were controlled by the centre 




the early 1980s as a criticism of the top down framework arguing that this was too 
simplistic and did not account for policy failure.  The bottom up approach suggested it 
is more realistic to consider policy implementation from the perspective of local 
communities and in particular front line service providers or street level bureaucrats 
(SLBs) such as teachers or social workers who, due to ambiguous policy goals, use a 
degree of discretion in how they implemented policy (Lipsky, 1980, 2010; Hull and 
Hjen, 1987). In both approaches the role of managers is largely overlooked.  Top down 
perspectives perceive managers as conduits for policy reform rather than having a direct 
role in its implementation.  In bottom up perspectives, the role of managers are limited 
to gaining SLB compliance and who do not pursue their own agendas although in his 
later work Lipsky (2010) acknowledges that managers can empower policy 
implementation. However, we argue that managers act as SLBs in their own right and 
are also able to use discretion in the implementation of policy. To test our ideas, we use 
the context of local government reform in Pakistan.  Our research question was to what 
extent were local managers able to exercise newly acquired powers of decision making?  
In answering this question, we develop a three-stage process model which suggests that 
while decentralisation did transfer powers to local levels, in practice discretion was 
limited due to constraints placed on managers from institutional pressures and actors at 
higher levels who were intent on holding onto power based on former provincial 
arrangements.   To overcome these constraints mangers engaged in what we term 
enacted discretion where they were able to overcome some constraints in decision 
making by using discretion based on micro-practices underpinned through individual, 
organisational and contextual factors.  Having set out the context of the paper, its 
structure is as follows.  In the next section, we provide an overview of the policy 




implementation continuum.  We then outline the context of our study and the local 
government reform agenda in Pakistan.  Finally, we describe our methodology and data 
analysis approaches before presenting our findings, discussion and conclusion.  
Policy Implementation 
Until the 1980s, studies of policy implementation were dominated by a top down 
perspective (O’Toole 2000; Sabatier 1991) which examined factors that contributed to 
reform failures (Cloutier et al. 2016; DeLeon and Linda 2002; Sabatier 1986).  These 
included poor policy design, poor planning, and a lack of communication (May and 
Winter 2009). During the 1980s a new wave of analytical frameworks provided a 
‘bottom up’ approach to policy implementation (Lipsky 1980) highlighting the pivotal 
role of SLBs who used discretion in delivering services to the public.   
Lipsky’s seminal work provided a framework that linked policy, organisational 
structure, resources, and SLB perceptions of policies. The central tenant of Lipsky’s 
framework (1980; p. xii) is that ‘the decision of street level bureaucrats, the routines 
they establish and the devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, 
effectively become the public policies they carry out’ and that public policies are best 
understood in ‘the crowded offices and daily encounters of street level workers’ 
(Op.Cit).  Lipsky characterised ‘discretion’ as a relative term making a distinction 
between ‘policy as written’ and ‘policy as performed’ (p.xvii).  This underlies a paradox 
as SLBs were both required to be responsive to local needs while at the same time were 
constrained in their discretion of who received services  
This paradox continued in subsequent SLB literature. Brodkin (2011b) suggests 
that discretion involves more than just responding to incentives or preferences. 




with performance incentives to create a street level calculus of choice. Stensöta (2012) 
argues that frontline workers’ discretion provides them with the latitude to interpret 
rules in the implementation process, and hence they become the ‘defacto bureaucratic 
policy makers’ when implementing programs. It is worth noting that the term discretion 
is used in several ways in the SLB literature with a distinction made between discretion 
as ‘degree of freedom as prescriptively granted by rule maker to an actor (discretion as 
granted’) and discretion as ‘actually being used’ (Hupe 2013, pp. 434-435).  Thus for 
Evetts (2002), discretion is freedom within constraints, while Tummers and Bekkers 
(2014, p. 530) discuss ‘discretion as experienced’ arguing that there is a positive 
relationship between discretion and a willingness to implement policies.   
Managers are located at an intermediary level between political elites who 
formulate policy and SLBs who practice policy at the service delivery level.  
Nevertheless, the implementation work of managers’ work at the service delivery level 
is not given due consideration in Lipsky’ SLB perspective with managers seen as 
simply striving to gain SLB’s compliance rather than pursuing their own agendas.  This 
omission ignores managers as SLBs in their own right who can also use discretion to 
influence the policy implementation process (Evans, 2015).  An under explored area 
(Matland, 1995), recent studies are beginning to examine the role of managers in policy 
implementation.  Soss et al (2011) in a study of welfare managers in Florida, examined 
managers discretion and found that despite pressures to conform to policy mandates, 
managers had broad discretion in that they were authorised to make a wide variety of 
decisions affecting the public.  Such discretion was ineradicable, in the sense that they 
could always find ways to push a decision in a direction they preferred despite the 




The policy literature also highlights the role of organisational forces in shaping 
implementation.  While explaining how such forces impinge on SLBs delivering front-
lines services, there are similar implications for managers.  Organisational forces 
include structures and processes (Lipsky 2010), the role of individual agency (Keiser 
and Soss 1998; Tummers, Bekkers and Steijn 2012), the personal characteristics of 
SLBs (Keiser 2010; Brodkin 2011) and macro and meso contextual influences (Hupe 
and Buffat 2014; Rice 2003) which can limit discretion.  Common themes from this 
literature suggests four explanations of understanding key influences on implementation 
practices.  Firstly, the policy design and resources devoted to policy execution (Van 
Meter and Van Horn 1975; Hill 2003) assumes that policy meanings are widely shared 
at the implementation level. In practice policy contains ambiguous if not conflicting 
goals with implementation decisions constrained by the interpretation of policy. Policies 
should also be accompanied by sufficient resources to enable organisations to do what 
they are expected to do (Brodkin 2011b). Capability issues such as poorly trained staff 
or the inadequacy of financial and human resources, often result in poor implementation 
of reforms (Hupe and Buffat 2014). The characteristics of the implementing 
organisations provide imperatives that can shape what happens at the service delivery 
level (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975, Sandfort 2000) which can include formal 
structures and processes (Hill 2003; Hill and Hupe 2008; Wellstead and Stedman 2010). 
There is also a recognition that the economic, political and social environment of the 
implementing agency affects not only the characteristics of implementing organisations 
but also their dispositions for change (Berman 1978). In particular, stakeholders at 
various institutional levels - politicians, bureaucrats in other agencies, and the managers 
of SLBs provide signals regarding the content and importance of policy which in turn 




Soss 1998; Stensöta 2011).  Managerial influences are particularly important as key 
communicators of policies and expectations to SLBs.  As decision-making authority is 
delegated, this consequently affects SLB levels of discretion (Hill 2006; Riccucci et al. 
2004). Finally, the role of personal values and attitudes towards policy issues and the 
interpretation of policies in relation to personal beliefs has been recognised as important 
in policy implementation (Goel 2014; Hupe and Buffat 2014; Meier 1993; Piore 2011). 
Maynard- Moody and Musheno (2003) argue that implementation actions are shaped by 
personal beliefs about what is fair or unfair and what publics are worthy or unworthy. In 
particular, the knowledge of policies and their interpretation play a significant role in 
implementation (Hill 2003; May and Winter 2009; Sandfort 2000) affecting decisions at 
the implementation level which has been referred to as ‘policy alienation’ (Tummers 
2013).  
 In sum, managerial discretion is an important topic in public 
management because it relates to the achievement of policy objectives including good 
governance, effectiveness in service delivery, and citizen satisfaction.  Further, because 
discretion is often the conduit through which such objectives are attained, we argue that 
greater attention is required to understand the characteristics and consequences of 
managerial discretion.  However,  the focus of much research has been at the top level 
much to the exclusion of managers located at lower levels, for example as found in local 
government, but who nevertheless, carry out work that is fundamental to policy 
implementation. This article thus aims to examine: 
1) the conditions under which managerial discretion is exercised, and the 
relative importance of factors that may influence discretionary outcomes and 
2)  how influences on managerial discretion impact successful 




In doing so, we use Lipsky’s framework as it provides a bottom up approach to 
examine managers’ discretion who are street level bureaucrat in their own right.  
Although, Lipsky’s key focus was on structural and contextual conditions and their 
impact on SLB’s discretion, we have adopt a more holistic approach and integrate 
structural and informal practices on shaping managers’ discretion as outlined in our 
process model of enacted discretion.  
Pakistan Local government and education reforms 
Following independence in 1947, Pakistan became a federal state consisting of four 
provinces; Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan which were divided 
into three administrative levels: Divisions, Districts and Tehsils.  A number of factors 
led to weak local government (Jalal 1995). Legitimacy was established by localized 
patronage acting as a conduit between local level constituencies and a non-
representative center. Governance was centralized and decisions regarding planning and 
development were not taken by local bodies which lacked legitimacy and 
responsiveness to local priorities with no incentives for high quality service delivery.  
These weaknesses resulted in a military coup in 1958 and the first of a series of military 
governments which centralized political power by the dissolution of elected provincial 
assemblies and the introduction of a presidential constitution which sought to preserve a 
non-representative institutional role at the centre (Paracha 2003).  Political power was 
centralized by the disqualification of political parties distorting electoral competition 
with the military governments requiring local government elections to be held on a non-
party basis.  Following the re-establishment of a civilian government and a return of 
political parties, local government structures from the military regimes were either 




The most recent reforms were initiated by the military government of General 
Pervez Musharraf in 2001 as part of a broader reform strategy linked to his main agenda 
of “reconstructing the institutions of the state” and establishing representative local 
government (Manning et al. 2003, p.1). The reforms emphasized citizen participation in 
the planning, development and oversight of service delivery. A national reconstruction 
Bureau (NRB) was charged with improving the organisation of local government 
(Government of Pakistan 2000). Under the new arrangements, the provincial 
government would be responsible for policy making, the regulation of the social sectors, 
and setting performance standards.  Financial resources and the administration of 
services would be transferred to local government. Critical to the reform policy was 
increased managerial discretion offered to local level managers in the delivery and 
management of education services.  Figure 1 provides an overview of the local 
government reforms. 
                                   [Insert figure 1 here] 
Under the reforms public services underwent a series of changes accompanied 
by devolution of administrative and financial control to the local government level.  We 
examine education services which became aligned with existing national policies of 
decentralizing which transferred primary, secondary and college education services 
from provincial education departments to district authorities (local government). 
Provinces would now determine education policy with local government implementing 
policy.  New levels of management were created at three levels: executive district 
officers (EDOs), district education officers (DEOs) and deputy district education 
officers (DDEOs).  Table 1 outlines their delegated powers under the reforms.     




The main element of the education reforms included (Ministry of Education 2002): 
 
• Devolving administrative and financial autonomy to education  
            Departments 
 
• Increasing client involvement in service provision though  
            constituting School Councils (SCs) to be responsible for the  
            management of schools  
 
• Encouraging third sector/NGO or private sector participation in service   
            delivery through a flagship programme called the ‘Adopt A School  
            initiative’ (AAS) which would provide additional resources for schools 
            and improve the education quality of failing or low performing  
            schools.   
 
Methodology 
We utilised a qualitative methodology based on semi-structured interviews with 
managers based in the education departments of Lahore (CDGL) and Faisalabad 
(CDGF), the second and third largest cities of Pakistan respectively.  This was 
supplemented by archival data concerning the delegation of powers, field notes and 
observations. We identified our interviewees through archival search and subsequently 
employed a snowball approach (Lincoln and Guba 1985) to identify other managers and 
so build up our data set.  To gain different perceptions of the reforms, interviews were 
conducted with each level of management (EDO/DEO/DDEO), the political heads of 
both local government areas and head teachers of secondary and primary schools. 
Interview questions focussing on the main decentralisation reform objectives including:  
decentralised managerial autonomy, financial and human resource autonomy, 
performance management arrangements, community involvement in education services 
and private/third sector involvement in service delivery.  The breakdown of 









Initially, data analysis was based on identifying first order categories from each 
interview. These categories were then subjected to thematic coding which allowed the 
examination of similarities and differences in the data leading to the identification of 
second order themes using the constant comparison method (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).  
For example, the data suggested that managers were constantly under pressure to deliver 
services with limited resources which could affect the level of discretion used. As a 
result the theme ‘resource constraints’ was developed.   In another example, we noted 
that managers often talked about the need for a change in the culture of local 
government which remained from the previous top-down bureaucracy.  Here the theme 
‘cultural inertia’ was developed to describe the problems this caused. Data analysis was 
an process iterative involving switching between theory and data until no more themes 
were identified and theoretical saturation was reached (Golden-Biddle and Locke 2007).  
From the analysis, eight second order themes were identified.  Finally, our second order 
themes were then condensed into more meaningful themes that formed overarching or 
aggregate dimensions linked with theory. The authors worked separately and then 
jointly on the analysis and interpretation of the findings to ensure consistency in 
interpretation.   NVivo software aided data analysis providing flexibility to reduce or 
expand initially generated themes and linking various themes together.   
Our data analysis revealed three overarching dimensions associated with the 
implementation of the reform policy:  organisational readiness, willingness for policy 




these three dimensions in relation to the broad policy intention of the reforms for 
education.  Figure 2 summarises the process of data analysis using a data structure table 
which includes our first order categories, second order themes and aggregate 
dimensions as set out by Goia et al. (2012).  The analysis is supported with interview 
quotations in order to illustrate our interpretation of the data.  Table 3 displays 
additional illustrative quotes.   
 
            [Insert figure 2 and table 3 Here} 
 
Findings     
Organisational readiness 
Organisational readiness was the extent that education department was ready to 
implement the reforms and allowed our managers to use their discretion in decision 
making.  Three themes were associated with organisational readiness: the local 
government context, capacity building and resource constraints faced by the 
implementing organisation.  
Local government context: policy reform sought to increase user involvement 
through SCs, and the AAS and were largely dependent on local contextual factors. For 
instance, EDOs had a positive perception of SCs and suggested how they would be able 
to facilitate discretion to improve their education service delivery:  
Before school councils, schools were always looking to the government for 
finances or approval to improve missing facilities. Now the school council has 
their own budget which they can spend according to their needs and do not need 
approval from the top. The creation of school councils has two main impacts, 
firstly, it has been able to reduce the teacher absenteeism and secondly, fund 
utilization is improved.  (EDO, CDGF) 
 
 






With the establishment of school council we are able to mobilize community for 
instance, once we need to repair the roofs of our school building, we raised 20% 
with the help of the community and then rest of the 80% was provided by the 
government. (Head Teacher (6) FSBD) 
 
However, DEOs had a different perspective on SCs noting that the demographic 
characteristics of local communities and the actors involved in service delivery were 
complex leading to variation in SC use for school improvements: 
School councils are not very effective because the community lacks awareness 
with respect to their role in school council or they do not want to take an 
interest. For example, if there is a meeting of the school council, usually, 
community members will not attend this meeting and will ask the head teacher 
to send the register to their homes for signs. There are some areas where school 
councils are very active but very rare. The government has done all to improve 
community participation, but the response from community is not very positive. 
(DEO, (9) CDGL). 
 
Rural areas in particular had less success with SCs.  Here, the literacy rate was 
lower and communities lacked a basic awareness regarding their role in the SC.  In such 
cases head teachers became the sole authority which could lead to the temptation for 
corruption or embezzlement of school funds: 
The community is very active since decentralization in school councils. However, 
it varies from area to area. Urban and rural areas have a different environment. In 
rural areas, due to the lack of education and awareness among the community 
regarding their role in the school council, school councils are not very active. 
Generally, in these areas control remains with the head of the institutions. In urban 
areas school councils help schools in finances plus moral support. (DDEO (F 15) 
CDGL)  
 
This provided DDEOs with the opportunity to exercise discretion by closely 
monitoring head teachers involved with SCs for the misuse of funds.  DDEO discretion 




misuse of authority of head teachers was reported.  Where performance was poor, 
discretion could be used to stop teacher salaries, demote or transfer teachers to other 
areas.  
Another policy initiative was the use of partnerships through the AAS.  In cases 
where the CDG and NGO believed in collaborative arrangements and were commitment 
to the policy, they were more active in using the AAS. For example, CDGF was the first 
district in Pakistan to embrace AAS’s as a key policy goal in 2006 mobilising the third 
sector, local communities and local industry in the provision of education service.  
Political support in CDGF was also evident allowing managers to gain more 
commitment in making these policies work.  
The City district Government Faisalabad is the first district in the entire country 
to legitimize a partnership policy framework from the district council CDGF on 
December 31, 2004. (Political Head of CDGF) 
 
However, similar perceptions were not shared equally amongst all mangers across our 
CDGs. Despite enthusiasm for the AAS at EDO level, DEOs and DDEOs of both CDGs 
could at time be frustrated with the AAS and subsequent day to day working 
arrangements of partners.  This was due to a lack of role clarity between the NGOs and 
education departments which was eventually resolved:  
Once the scheme of AAS was started, there were uncertainties among the staff 
of that school that may be the NGO s are going to be another authority over 
them. But slowly and gradually, this misperception was removed and now we 
are quite clear with respect to their roles. Their main purpose was to facilitate 
learning, provide missing facilities, and improve staff shortage. Then, these 
NGO s tried to monitor staff, which raised various issues as it was not their role 
to monitor. Now we have clarified this issue, if they are not satisfied with any of 
the teacher they come to us and then we try to check their complaint and take 





Capacity building: working with the local community and NGOs required a 
different skill set in how to reach out to local partners and deal with the difficulties of 
consulting communities and NGOs.  Comparing both CDGs, we found that CDGF took 
more of an initiative in providing partnership training for their managers, teachers and 
head teachers allowing better partner management with SC’s, the third sector and their 
community.   
We established an Institute of Learning with the help of corporate sector which 
provides training to the teachers and for the school council members. (EDO, 
CDGF) 
 
This paid off in that SCs could be used as a strategic tool to meet school needs through 
raising funds for school improvements. For example, according to the EDO for CDGF, 
local government allocated Rs.300,000 to the 245 WSD schools in rural and urban areas 
with 10% of this fund from community contributions. In this way, DDEOs had some 
discretion in empowering their schools to manage their resources more effectively so 
reducing the need to rely on the state for all project funding: a point we return to later.   
Nevertheless, increased user involvement and collaborative service delivery 
arrangements did expose managers to more pressure with their ability to exercise 
discretion dependent on how well they understood the challenges and relationships 
between different actors and how their work impacted the operation of these structures 
and processes. 
Resource constraints: a key area in the exercise of discretion was the ability to 
commit resources to the delivery of education services.  The reforms created new roles 
and responsibilities while introducing new reporting mechanisms. However, this was 




discretion, an area noted in the implementation literature as causing policy failure (Hill, 
2003). For example, DDEOs indicated that there were many schools that they had to 
inspect under their jurisdictions but they were not provided with adequate transport 
facilities to carry out their jobs effectively: 
I have to visit too many schools (345 schools) which are not humanly possible 
.If I visit a school once, that school become relaxed as they know we will not be 
able to check them for another 4-5 months. Some of the schools are in such 
remote areas that we are not able to make frequent visits to them. This is one of 
the reasons that schools are not performing well, as they (schools) know we 
cannot monitor them properly. (DDEO (7) CDGF) 
 
 
DEOs also noted that their work had also become increasingly challenging due to the 
vagueness in financial rules and procedures and a lack of knowledge regarding their 
operation. There was though a general agreement among DEOs and DDEOs that 
engaging local communities was essential if they wanted to bring change to their 
schools with DEOs in particular using the reform policy to mobilise school involvement 
to find ways to engage communities that addressed school issues through SCs. DEOs 
highlighted that during school visits, they tried to encouraged the local community to 
engage with the SC to raise finance to meet their resource problems which led to 
positive levels of engagement with the local community and school more generally: 
Now the city district government has allocated school councils their own funds 
and people know that during school council meetings they are being consulted 
on various issues so they participate in those meetings. 70% of the school 
council members attend school council meetings. ----They are monitoring our 
schools, which has improved the transparency of the utilization of school funds 
and teacher attendance. In some cases they have even raised funds for school 
buildings. (DEO (F 11) CDGL) 
 
In sum organisational readiness allowed for some discretion for our managers as SLBs 




relationships with partners.  While resource constraints often limit the use of discretion 
building positive relationships with schools and local communities were used to raise 
funds so reducing the need for central funding requests. 
Willingness for policy adoption 
Our second overarching dimension, willingness for policy adoption, focused on specific 
issues associated with our managers’ willingness to implement the reform policy and 
how much this affected their discretion.  Three themes were identified: policy design, 
stakeholder values and attitudes and cultural inertia. 
Policy design: the reform policy was intended to allow substantial 
decentralisation of decision making to local levels. Our interviews with EDOs identified 
that reform implementation required a decoupling of the pre-reform culture with its top 
down decision-making approach from the new reforms.  This was not happening.  
DDEOs stated their frustration with this and that the decision-making process was 
devoid of a participative approach so creating an indifference to implementing the new 
arrangements: 
We are not involved in the decision making process at any forum. During 
departmental meetings we are not given opportunity to give our input, it is more 




This lack of involvement resulted in a loss of clarity on a number of policy issues which 
is characteristic of implementation failure (May and Winter 2009; May 2015).  For 
example, all managerial levels reported concerns regarding the lack of clarity in 
financial rules and overbearing external audits as one of the key factors that limited 




reported that the auditing system could lead to additional pressure and workload which 
restricted a desire to make spending requests.  Nevertheless, there were instances when 
managers did at times base discretion on normative choices of ‘who is worthy of help’ 
discretion as ineradicable (Soss et al 2011) rather than on government criteria and bent 
rules to make exceptions:  
Financial rules are not very clear. This is one of the reasons of underutilization 
of funds, people fear that if they spend utilized funds, then they may face an 
audit Para. Take for example, we needed to sanction scholarship worth 50 lace 
rupees. The District Co-ordinating Officer did not do it himself and asked me to 
do it. I did it. The result was the audit Para asking for an explanation. However, 
at the end it was all settled. (EDO, CDGF) 
 
The extent managers were committed to implement policies was also dependent 
on whether they perceived policies were feasible to implement.  Any psychological 
disconnect from policy led to policy alienation (Timmers 2013) creating a commitment 
gap. For instance, managers revealed that at times they could face problems with policy 
implementation as policy makers had not thought out the challenges faced at the 
practice level. Referring to experience in relation to community and third sector 
engagement, the EDO of Faisalabad commented that:  
The main problem is that policies are not properly implemented. For example, a 
scheme was launched under the name of CPP (community public partnership). 
Under this arrangement, it was proposed that the primary schools should be 
converted into middle schools in the evening, middle schools should be 
upgraded to high schools and secondary schools should be upgraded to higher 
secondary schools. Government was supposed to provide the building and 
operation and maintenance was to be performed by community. The outcome of 
this scheme was people who participated in this partnership could not bear the 
cost at the end. If it had been done in stepwise, it would have been better. It was 
a good policy but Government did not consider the feasibility of this. (EDO, 
CDGF).  
 
Stakeholders’ values and attitudes:  EDO experience and values significantly 




EDOs with different backgrounds: CDGL was led by an EDO hired through the 
Pakistan public service commission and directly appointed as the senior manager of its 
education department. During previous tenure in CDGF, he had led collaborations with 
the third sector in education services which had positive benefits and who then 
replicated some of those initiatives in CDGL: 
I have tried to replicate a few initiatives at Lahore, for instance, I tried to 
develop the HRM-IS system here, and school profiling has been computerized. I 
have also organized financial managerial training. The whole school model has 
also initiated which targets to improve school from inside out. These are based 
from my Faisalabad experience. (EDO, CDGL) 
 
The education department of CDGF on the other hand was led by an EDO who 
had reached the top ladder through hierarchical progression in the teaching profession 
and had not been exposed to collaborative and networking working which manifested 
itself in fewer relationship building with different stakeholders. This led to fewer 
partnerships in CDGL and an indifference to the initiatives of his predecessor.  Thus, 
the commitment of the EDO to reform implementation and professional networking had 
a role to play in use of discretion.  This was not only in securing the necessary political 
support from within and outside the local government organisation but also helped in 
influencing organisational members commitment to policy reform. Willingness to adopt 
reforms was contingent on EDO professional values and prior experience, an area 
already noted in the literature which highlights how policy preferences (Hill 2003; May 
and Winter 2009; Rice 2012) or policy alienation (Tummers 2013) shape micro level 
decisions.   
Cultural inertia: organisational culture was another important variable in 




the reforms in some quarters.  This was down to the pre-existing culture of the 
provincial government.  Under the decentralisation reforms, the environment in the 
education sector shifted to a new world characterized by devolved management, 
increased user and third sector involvement in service provision. However, although 
decentralisation brought structural changes, internal practices and attitude to the reforms 
took time to change. According to the EDO of CDGL, a shift to a bottom up approach 
to decision making met with resistance from those who had previously enjoyed 
significant power under the pre-reform arrangements: 
 
The basic impediment to decentralisation is non-conducive and less adaptive 
organizational culture. We need to bring a change in the organisation culture and 
transform it from bureaucratic highly centralised system to the one based on 
democratic values. Rather than powers being centralised at the top, powers 
should be decentralised down the hierarchy in order to improve organizational 
performance. (EDO, CDGL) 
 
 
DEOs confirmed this and argued that the government was asking them to implement 
initiatives without considering local cultural factors.  For example, school instruction 
delivered in English was gradually introduced as a key education policy which was 
found to be particularly challenging to implement:  
People do not accept change as it is, they resist it. For instance, recent 
government initiatives regarding English as a medium of instruction’ has met 
with resistance from teachers and education department. Government has not 
envisaged the practical considerations, what kind of issues and challenges our 
teacher will face. They are not ready for it…. There should be democratisation 
of education…..we should be involved in the process of making such policies as 
we are more aware of the issues at the service level. (DEO (3), CDGF).  
 
  
Summarising, willingness for policy adoption played an important role in explaining 




not been given enough practical thought and lacked commitment by government in 
relation to the need to change existing culture to be more democratic. Previous 
experience and professional networks allowed a degree of discretion in decision making 




Our third aggregate dimension, implementation praxis, focussed on the 
practicalities of managerial discretion when implementing the Musharraf reforms 
(Brodkin and Majmundar 2010). Three themes were identified that focussed on the 
practicalities of discretion: bureaucratic control, role ambiguity over the reform policy 
and power plays in vetting local decision making. 
Bureaucratic control: while education service delivery was devolved to the 
education departments and provided managers with administrative and financial 
powers, managers stated that the provincial bureaucracy which was responsible for 
education service delivery in the previous system, did not want to let go of power and 
tried to curtail local government decision making.  For example, in 2006 the delegation 
of powers was amended with financial powers transferred to District Coordinating 
Officers who were in overall control of local government removing spending discretion 
from the EDOs (Khan and Munawar 2011).   
Powers have been centralised in the District Coordinating Officer rather than the 
technical person who understand ground realities and the frontline issues in 
education service delivery’.  (EDO, CDGL) 
 
This resulted in a power struggle between EDOs, local politicians and the local 
bureaucracy. Nevertheless, within this rule-bound system, EDOs did find ways to cope 




to offering kickbacks to officials involved in audit inspections to avoid the doing 
paperwork and subsequent audit objections. Where discretion was used, it would be 
followed by the provincial bureaucracy using accountability mechanisms to criticise and 
block the decisions of EDOs: 
There are too many agencies involved in checking our performance; however, 
their attitude is very negative. If you are committed to find what is wrong, you 
will find everything is wrong. Too many bosses’ means there are more doors to 
skip. (EDO, CDGL) 
 
Role ambiguity: different managerial levels had different perceptions of the extent of 
choice in exercising their discretion.  For the EDOs, delegation of powers were 
perceived as ‘overloading one tier’ with more responsibilities, and for other 
management levels it was perceived as ‘writing reports, more paperwork and mundane 
jobs’.  DEOs and DDEOs on the other hand, considered that rather than decentralising 
power, power was recentralised at the top with the bureaucratic heads of local 
government having more power. The EDO for CDGL confirmed this stating that 
development projects were based on bureaucratic whims rather than ‘where they are 
needed’ resulting in waste or duplication of resources that again reduced the discretion 
of lower level managers: 
 
Power plays: despite the administrative and financial discretion devolved to the 
education departments, the work of managers were heavily influenced by the support 
received from their political representatives and the bureaucracy at the local level.  
Although devolution had created a higher administrative status for managers, they faced 
political and bureaucratic influences which could curtail their discretion, a theme 




2004). Managers highlighted that although they had more financial autonomy, they had 
less administrative autonomy.  They had the power to spend resources but needed 
administrative authority to do so.   This was more significant at the DDEO level:  
 
On paper, we have administrative and financial discretion, but in practice we 
just implement the orders of our senior management. Whatever budget proposal 
we submit, it faces cuts by our senior management. (DDEO, (3) CDGF) 
 
 
DDEOs thought that at times they were partially empowered but at other times they 
were only signing authorities following the orders of their superiors with little 
discretion: 
I am partially empowered; decentralization is followed by recentralization of 
powers at the top. If I want to take any action against those who are not 
performing well, I will start getting pressure from the top. Therefore I will not 
be able to take any action. (DDEO,(2) CDGL) 
 
In short, implementation praxis became challenging for managers acting as SLBs due to 
the continued control exerted by the provincial bureaucracy.  This led to conflict and a 
power struggle with our managers.  While financial autonomy was devolved, 
administrative autonomy was more elusive especially at lower management levels. 
 
Discussion  
Our study has examined policy implementation and local government reform in 
Pakistan using the context of education services.  We have focussed on education 
managers as SLBs and their role in the policy implementation process.   Our research 
question asked to what extent were managers able to exercise their newly acquired 
powers of discretion in decision making?  In answering our research question we 




data collected from interviews with EDOs, DEOs and DDEOs. We now elaborate on 
our model and our contribution to the literature.  Our model is summarised in Figure 3 
and is organised around our three aggregated dimensions that emerged from the data 
structure summarised in figure 2.  
 
                [Insert figure 3 here] 
 
The education reforms had three key elements: the devolution of administrative 
and financial autonomy to education departments; increasing service-user involvement 
in service provision through SCs and; allowing the third sector to participate in 
education service e delivery through the AAS.  Our primary contribution is to suggest 
that managers implemented the Musharraf reforms using what we term enacted 
discretion.  We developed the concept of enacted managerial discretion by building on 
Soss et al’s (2011) ‘broad vs deep’ discretion and Tummers and Bekker (2014) 
‘discretion as experienced’.  Although the reforms were intended to allow 
administrative and financial decision making to be devolved locally, this was limited 
due to constraining factors associated with the reforms including a lack of resources 
allocated to the reform process, a cultural legacy of top down decision making and 
attempts by the previous provincial bureaucracy to control decision making – what 
Evetts (2002) terms discretion with constraints.  Enacted discretion allowed a degree of 
freedom to make decisions which we explain by using the three aggregate dimensions 
of organisational readiness, willingness for policy adoption and implementation praxis.  
The first phase, organisational readiness, set out the context of managerial discretion, 
and underlies that managerial discretion to implement reforms is contingent upon 




constraints. The core emphasis was that policies needed to take into account of the 
issues and challenges at the local level that enabled local government organisations and 
their managers to enact their discretion to implement policy reforms.  The literature on 
SLBs has highlighted resource issues (Lipsky, 1980) referring to terms such as 
‘enablements’ (Hupe and Buffat 2014) and ‘management-by enabling’ which focus on 
internal capacity.  Organisational readiness extends these concepts by suggesting that 
the role of the internal and external environment is important in determining the extent 
managers can enact their discretion as provided to them under the policy reforms and is 
thus concomitant in making policies work at the practice level. Organisational 
characteristics aimed at enabling managers to build capacity emerged as a significant 
influence on developing a clear understanding of the reforms as this further determined 
the extent managers were willing to enact their discretion to make those reforms work. 
Reforms such as increased user involvement in service provision exposed managers to 
more pressures and required a new set of role expectation. Hence, managers’ discretion 
to implement such reforms was largely depended on how well managers understood the 
challenges associated with such reforms and were equipped with the relevant skill set to 
cope with such challenges. However, the problem of resource and capacity issues were 
always a key constraint.  For example, while financial resources were devolved, the 
discretion in using them in the provision of education services was made more 
challenging by having to gain administrative support higher up – discretion as granted 
(Hupe and Buffat, 2014).  In general, DEOs and DDEOs noted that the resources 
allocated to the new system were not sufficient to allow it to operate as intended which 
limited their discretion and was more noticeable at the DDEO level. This links with 
phase two, willingness for policy adoption.  The emphasis in phase two was based on 




agenda and their re-construction of policy which affected their levels of commitment 
and subsequently their willingness for policy adoption. Tummers and Bekkers (2014) 
contend that SLB willingness to enact their discretion to implement policies increases if 
they perceive policies to be meaningful for the public which resulted in the greater use 
of discretion. Our analysis underscores that how far managers were willing to adopt 
policies and enact discretion depended on the reform policy design, stakeholder values, 
attitudes to the reforms and cultural inertia. This suggests that a combination of 
individual, organisational factors and contextual issues may explain the varying levels 
of managers’ willingness to enact their discretion to implement reforms.  The lack of 
willingness to enact discretion results from a lack of clarity regarding policy issues 
which is further exacerbated by key stakeholders values and prior experiences, 
particularly if they consider those reforms cannot help their clients, and the pre-existing 
cultural inertia which resist change. Phase three, implementation praxis, suggests how 
managers used their discretion in their micro or day to day practice within the 
constraints of their organisational settings. This particularly highlights that the instances 
managers were able to resist bureaucratic control through the use of their power play 
tactics and enact their discretion to make policies work. For instance, EDOs were able 
to use informal relationships from stages one and two to build social capital to resist 
political interference seen through ways to circumvent bureaucratic control that 
deliberately limited discretion from higher levels. For example,  managers’ emphasis on 
the use of SCs to raise additional funding for schools rather than completely relying on 
state funding and the hurdles that this would ensure, what Soss et al (2011) term 
ineradicable discretion. Political influences could also create a mismatch between 
intended policy objectives and role constraints that managers faced on their choice of 




and coped with political influences was dependent on their leadership skills and ability 
to network with other professionals and local communities. This was not a linear or 
sequential process but occurred iteratively as shown by the two feedback loops in figure 
3 with managers often going backwards and forwards over time.  In this way personal 
values and knowledge towards the policy reform shaped their approach to policy 
implementation.  While Lipsky (1980) contends that managers only strive to gain SLB 
compliance and do not pursue their own interests we found that our EDO, DDO and 
DDEO managers enacted discretion as SLBs in their own right. 
 Another goal of the Musharraf reforms was increased user and third sector 
involvement.  This was achieved via the SCs and the AAS scheme. However, the 
successful implementation of these reforms was contingent on our process model as 
outlined earlier. The use of diverse actors in service provision were perceived by EDOs 
as a powerful discretionary tool to meet the scarce resource problem education was 
facing in service delivery. In cases where such an understanding prevailed, managers 
showed more willingness for policy adoption of such policy initiatives and able to enact 
their discretion while coping with the issues associated with their organisational 
readiness.  Existing studies examining education reform in Pakistan have noted that the 
initial response to the reforms was resistance from various stakeholders, particularly 
bureaucrats who were set to lose their status and power from pre-devolution structures 
(Jamil 2006; Shah 2003; Zaidi 2005).   
Our study is not without its weaknesses.  We focussed on two education 
departments in two of the largest City areas in Pakistan.  Future research in other areas 
of Pakistan local government such as housing or roads, would allow a greater 
comparison of the utility of the reforms whilst providing cross service comparisons to 




relationships between its military and civilian government, may also be an extreme case 
which limits generalisation to other contexts. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined policy implementation in a developing country, 
Pakistan, an area where less empirical work on policy implementation has been carried 
out.  The paper contributes to the literature by focusing on the role of managers as SLBs 
in their own right, an under researched area. The findings have implications for the 
theory and practice. For theory, we develop the extant literature on SLBs concerning the 
paradox of discretion and highlight the role of individual, organisational and contextual 
factors on the exercise of managerial discretion.  Through our process model, we 
suggest the extent managers were able to enact discretion was dependent on the 
interactive nature of organisational readiness, willingness for policy adoption and 
implementation praxis.  That is, managers face exactly the same challenges to the use of 
discretion in policy implementation as SLBs who deliver services face to face with 
clients 
For practitioners, we suggest that policy makers would benefit from a deeper 
understanding of the nature and context of managers when they propose policy reforms. 
For example, although the Pakistan local government reforms of 2001 created structural 
changes, these changes were not accompanied with resources resulting in capability and 
capacity problems at the practice level. Policy makers often underestimate the role of 
existing organisational culture and norms and the time it may take to adapt to new 
practices which is important to determine whether organisations are ready to undertake 
such challenges or not. What happens in the initial stages of policy implementation is 




be more aware of day to day challenges of managers as they are also directly involved 
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Table 1: Roles and Responsibilities of interviewees following the Local government Reforms 
Managerial level Administrative powers Financial powers 
EDO - Executive District Officer   Supervision and coordination of all wings of education in the district.  
 Review annual performance of the district officers and subordinate staff, 
identify employee training needs, arrange training program for them, take 
disciplinary action for maintaining good discipline in its schools 
 (EDO was the head of the Education Department and was a newly 
created post under Local government reform 2001. Pre-devolution, 
education department was under the provincial supervision) 
 Preparation and execution of the Annual development Plan, 
 Internal audit and settlement of those audit objections,  
 Sanctions of pensions fund up to grade 19-20 
DEO (SE) – District Education 
Officer  
Secondary Education (Grade 9-
12) 
 Registration of private secondary schools 
 Conduct middle standard examination 
 Internal inspection and audit of the institutions 
 (Prior to decentralisation, director of secondary education was responsible 
for the posting, transfers, promotion and registration of secondary schools 
in the district) 
 Preparation of annual development plan 
 Grant of pension funds (GP funds)  up to BS 18 
 Reimbursement of medical charges up to BS 17 
 Award of scholarships 




 Appointment authority of elementary teachers 
 Promotion of teaching staff 
 Issuance of retirement notification 
 Transfer of teaching staff 
 Ensure proper functioning of school councils 
 Registration of primary and elementary private school 
 Technical inspection and internal audit of the schools 
 Conduct examinations 
 Preparation and execution of annual development 
 Grant of pensions funds advance 
 Sanctions of pensions, medical reimbursement claims, grant of 
medical leave 
DDEO – Deputy District 
Education Officer 
 Appointment of non-teaching staff  
 Ensure proper functioning of school councils 
 Sanction leave of head teachers of elementary schools and Assistant 
education officer (AEO) 
 Sanction earned leave and ex-Pakistan leave of PTC teachers 
 Forward cases of teachers to higher authorities 
 Drawing and disbursement officers 
 Release of salaries to teaching staff 
 Preparation of contingency plans for their schools 
 Preparation and execution of budget of its own staff 
 Collection and monitoring of budget of its own staff 
 Collection and monitoring of financial data from the institutions 
 Perform internal audits and technical inspection of institutions 














Head of the 
Education 
Department 
Executive District Officer 1 1 
Senior Management District education officer(Male/Elementary 
education)  
1 1 
District education officer(Female/Elementary 
education)  
1  0 
District education officer(Male/Secondary 
education)  
1 1 





Deputy District Education Officer 
(male/elementary) 
4 1 
Deputy District Education Officer 
(female/elementary)  
2 3 
Deputy District Education Officer 
(male/secondary)  
0 1 
Deputy District Education Officer (female 
/Secondary  
1 0 
Head teachers  Female (Secondary School) 
Female (Primary School) 

















Unlearning prior assumptions – transformation from to down 
to decentralise system 
Democratic cultural values do not persist 
Stakeholders’ engagement 
Adhocism in the system - change in governments lead to 
discontinue previous policies 
Relabelling old policies 





Discretion controlled through rules and procedures 
Discretion curtailed through blaming competence of the staff 
Budget cuts, Audit objections  
Powers curtailed through amendments in the LGO 2001 





Senior management control hiring and posting of staff 
Political elites influence hiring, firing& posting/transfer of 
staff 
Discretion means emphasis on writing reports, paperwork- 
report writing perceived as additional work 
Supervisors assign additional workload 









Employees’ attitude to change - people do not like 
change, Work ethics,  
Non adaptive organisational culture to democratic 
values, open communications  
Organisational 
Readiness 
Capacity building of stakeholders – how to implement 
policies, Lack of knowledge, IT- information consolidation 
Lack of information on policies reforms 
Vagueness in rules and procedures,  
Workload pressure affects inspection of all the schools, too 
many schools to visit; Hard to reach areas less monitored 
Resource 
constraints 
Financially autonomous local government face less resource 
constraints when faced with economic instability in the 
Characteristics of local community affect their engagement 
 




1st Order Categories 2nd Order Themes Aggregated 
Dimensions 
Personal networking with internal and external stakeholders 




Table 2. Selected examples of aggregate dimensions, categories and themes 
 













3. Capacity building 
A1. Under the current economic instability, we are facing financial constraints because of provincial governments freezing Local government budgets. 
We are unable to pay teachers’ salaries since last six months. (DDO (M-5) CDGF) 
 
 
B1. I have to visit too many schools (345 schools). Mostly if I visit a school it becomes relaxed for another 4-5 months as they know I will not be able 
to check them. Some schools are in such remote hard to reach areas that we are not able to visit them frequently. This is one of the reasons that schools 
in remote areas are not performing very well. (DDO, (F-8) CDGF) 
 
 
C1. Training of DEO and DDEO should be organized regarding budgeting financial management at all levels. Training has been organized but it 
should be regular basis. People should be given more orientation regarding new intervention for strong checks and balances. (EDO, CDGL) 
Willingness for policy 
adoption 
 
4. Policy design  D1. Policies are not properly implemented because policy maker do not take into account challenges that we face at the practice level. They want us to 
implement policies revamping the old system without considering the feasibility of that policy, how to do that. Whereas if we adopt an incremental or 
phased approach we have more chances of successful implementation. (EDO, CDGF) 
 







6. Cultural inertia 
 
E1. School councils are very effective way of engaging community in service provision, financing and transparent utilization of school funds. 






F1. The basic impediment to decentralisation is non-conducive and less adaptive organizational culture. We need to bring a change in the organisation 
culture and transform it from bureaucratic highly centralised system to the one based on democratic values. Rather than powers being centralised at the 






















9. Power Plays 
G1. I have administrative and financial powers but I cannot exercise them. Powers only exist in policy papers, practically we cannot use them. I have 
the financial powers of category 3 officer and I can purchase Computers for my office. But now I am facing the problems of justifying this purchase as 
I have an audit objection on this item. Now, in order to settle this objection, I have to spend extra hours and resources------external auditors raise 




H1. Decentralization does not mean overloading one tier with lots of responsibilities. For instance, you have to delegate power in such a way that can 
be managed by that organization/tier/individual.  For instance, District Coordinating Officer (Bureaucratic head of the CDG) has been assigned 
enormous responsibilities. If you want to rationalize the system, powers should be delegated from the DCO down the hierarchy such EDO who are the 
departmental heads. Overloading of power results in administrative lapses. Another factor affecting performance is duplication of work. Some of the 
powers are being exercised by District Nazim, DCO, and provincial departments which are hindering the proficiency of the lower tier. (EDO, CDGL) 
 
I1. Powers are not devolved in practice. There is violation of power. If we visit schools and find teachers underperforming, we cannot punish them, as 
those who are punished will approach their political representatives and then we will start getting pressure from them to do nothing against them. 






Figure 4: A model of managerial enacted discretion in implementing Pakistan education policy reforms 
 
 
Key education reforms: Devolution of administrative and financial autonomy to education departments; increasing user involvement 
through SCs and; use of ASS scheme to assist with increased provision of school funding to improve facilities and quality of education 
for children. 
 
